Warranted Assertibility and the Uniformity of Nature

Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 9 (2):110 - 115 (1973)
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Abstract

Dewey defines knowledge as the outcome of competent inquiry. but knowledge is for dewey fundamentally predictive. this gives rise to a difficulty: should the course of nature change, a man might both know something (having carried out the relevant inquiry) and not know it (his relevant predictions being false). this difficulty is set out formally, and a solution is proposed in terms of dewey's concept of warranted assertibility

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Georges Dicker
State University of New York (SUNY)

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