Stapp's theorem without counterfactual commitments: Why it fails nonetheless

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 24 (5):791-814 (1993)
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Abstract

Stapp's attempt to derive Bell's Inequality from a weak locality condition while retaining indeterminism, requires careful scrutiny to ensure unambiguous definitions and valid reasoning. Such scrutiny reveals that the argument is fallacious. This result is obtained without commitment to any particular formal analysis of truth conditions for counterfactuals nor to conditions for world similarity.

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Michael Dickson
University of South Carolina

Citations of this work

On the Meaning of Local Realism.Justo Pastor Lambare - 2022 - Foundations of Physics 52 (5):1-15.
Reply to H. Stapp's comment.Michael Dickson - 1994 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 25 (6):965-966.
How to (properly) strengthen Bell's theorem using counterfactuals.Tomasz Bigaj - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 41 (1):58-66.

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References found in this work

Bell’s Theorem: What It Takes.Jeremy Butterfield - 1992 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 43 (1):41-83.
David Lewis meets John bell.Jeremy Butterfield - 1992 - Philosophy of Science 59 (1):26-43.

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