An empirical reply to empiricism: Protective measurement opens the door for quantum realism

Philosophy of Science 62 (1):122-140 (1995)
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Quantum mechanics has sometimes been taken to be an empiricist (vs. realist) theory. I state the empiricist's argument, then outline a recently noticed type of measurement--protective measurement--that affords a good reply for the realist. This paper is a reply to scientific empiricism (about quantum mechanics), but is neither a refutation of that position, nor an argument in favor of scientific realism. Rather, my aim is to place realism and empiricism on an even score in regards to quantum theory



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Michael Dickson
University of South Carolina

Citations of this work

Entropy - A Guide for the Perplexed.Roman Frigg & Charlotte Werndl - 2011 - In Claus Beisbart & Stephan Hartmann (eds.), Probabilities in Physics. Oxford University Press. pp. 115-142.
An argument for ψ-ontology in terms of protective measurements.Shan Gao - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 52 (Part B):198-202.
Protective Measurements and the Reality of the Wave Function.Shan Gao - 2022 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 73 (3):777-794.

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