Disagreements: Anscombe, Geach, Wittgenstein

Philosophical Investigations 38 (1-2):1-24 (2015)
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My essay explains and examines Anscombe's disagreement with Wittgenstein about what the Tractatus supposedly excludes. I also discuss her apparent disagreement with Geach about propositions that lack an intelligible negation. My discussion of these disagreements leads to the topic of Anscombe on the relation between the “business of thinking” and truth. I suggest that she takes the business of thinking to include thinking that helps to keep thinking on track. Since there is a tie between thinking truly and the business of thinking being done well and since helping to keep thinking on track belongs to the business of thinking, helpings-of-thinking can be described as true



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Cora Diamond
University of Virginia

References found in this work

Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1962 - Proceedings of the British Academy 48:187-211.
Philosophical remarks.Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1975 - Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Edited by Rush Rhees.
Culture and value.Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1977 - Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Edited by G. H. von Wright & Heikki Nyman.
Collected Papers on Mathematics, Logic, and Philosophy.Gottlob Frege - 1991 - Wiley-Blackwell. Edited by Brian McGuinness.
Ethics with Aristotle.Sarah Broadie - 1991 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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