Abstract
A cursory view of the history of ethical thinking shows the presence of a limited variety of 'styles of ethical reasoning', a term used in analogy of Crombie's 'styles of scientific reasoning' for systems of thought that set their own standards and techniques for providing evidence. Each style of reasoning tends to suggest a specific role for ethicists. Styles are appropriate relative to particular contexts of problems and require special institutions to flourish. Herman De Dijn's discussion in Taboes, monsters en loterijen of the problems hybridsproduced in biomedicine and biotechnology pose for the symbolic order is shown to rest on two 'styles of ethical reasoning', viz, 'postulation of principles' and 'hermeneutics'. It is argued that both styles fall short, but for different reasons. 'Postulation of principles' is ill-equipped to answer problems posed by a world of change. Hermeneutics requires a pace of time and institutions not available in current society. Confronted with the problems De Dijn discusses, therefore two separate problems arise. Ethicistsnot only have to learn how to account for the hybrids that biomedicine and biotechnology produce, they also have to think about and contribute to institutional innovation. Rather than opening a space for discussing both tasks, De Dijn's styles of reasoning close off this matter