Brainreading of perceptual experiences: a challenge for first-person authority?

Anthropology and Philosophy 7 (1-2):151-162 (2006)
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Abstract

According to a traditional Cartesian view of the mind, you have a privileged access to your own conscious experiences that nobody else can have. Therefore, you have more authority than anybody else on your own experiences. Perceptual experiences are selfintimating: you are aware of what you are consciously perceiving. If you report seeing a pink elephant, nobody is entitled to deny it. There may be no pink elephant, but you do have the conscious experience of such elephant. However, the progress in brain imaging might lead to the possibility that the scientist knows as well as you – or even better than you – what you are seeing, and even what you are hallucinating. What was only a thought experiment fourty years ago has become reality. Does brain reading challenge the privacy of the mind? Who has the most authority on your mind in case of conflict? You or the brain scientist?

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Frédérique de Vignemont
Institut Jean Nicod

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