Synthese 200 (1):1-19 (2022)

Corey Dethier
Leibniz University Hanover
I argue that the appropriateness of an assertion is sensitive to context—or, really, the “common ground”—in a way that hasn’t previously been emphasized by philosophers. This kind of context-sensitivity explains why some scientific conclusions seem to be appropriately asserted even though they are not known, believed, or justified on the available evidence. I then consider other recent attempts to account for this phenomenon and argue that if they are to be successful, they need to recognize the kind of context-sensitivity that I argue for.
Keywords Assertion  Science communication  Context  Common ground  Norms of assertion  Social epistemology
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-022-03580-7
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The Wrongs of Racist Beliefs.Rima Basu - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2497-2515.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
Doxastic Wronging.Rima Basu & Mark Schroeder - 2019 - In Brian Kim & Matthew McGrath (eds.), Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. Routledge. pp. 181-205.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
Context.Robert Stalnaker - 2014 - Oxford University Press.

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Calibrating Statistical Tools: Improving the Measure of Humanity's Influence on the Climate.Corey Dethier - 2022 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 94:158-166.

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