On interpreting Gödel's second theorem

Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):297 - 313 (1979)
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Abstract

In this paper I have considered various attempts to attribute significance to Gödel's second incompleteness theorem (G2 for short). Two of these attempts (Beth-Cohen and the position maintaining that G2 shows the failure of Hilbert's Program), I have argued, are false. Two others (an argument suggested by Beth, Cohen and ??? and Resnik's Interpretation), I argue, are groundless.

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Michael Detlefsen
Last affiliation: University of Notre Dame

Citations of this work

Hilbert's program then and now.Richard Zach - 2006 - In Dale Jacquette (ed.), Philosophy of Logic. North Holland. pp. 411–447.
Hilbert's philosophy of mathematics.Marcus Giaquinto - 1983 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 34 (2):119-132.
Extensions of the Finitist Point of View.Matthias Schirn & Karl-Georg Niebergall - 2001 - History and Philosophy of Logic 22 (3):135-161.
On a theorem of Feferman.Michael Detlefsen - 1980 - Philosophical Studies 38 (2):129 - 140.

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References found in this work

Comments on the Foundations of Set Theory.Paul J. Cohen - 1975 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 40 (3):459-460.

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