Luis Villoro y el canon cartesiano de la evidencia

Signos Filosóficos 1 (1):139-173 (1999)
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Abstract

"œLuis Villoro y el canon cartesiano de la evidencia"La lectura ortodoxa o canónica de los textos filosóficos cartesianos supone que el clásico cree haber hallado fundamentos intrí­nsecamente evidentes e irrebatibles para normar según ellos las pretensiones de conocimiento. Esta serí­a la única manera de resistirse al escepticismo extremo. El libro de Villoro sobre Descartes investiga cómo podrí­an satisfacerse rigurosamente estos postulados y formula una propuesta sustantiva que parece expresarse en ciertas teorí­as cartesianas. Sin embargo, éstas deben separarse de otras muchas doctrinas dogmáticas presentes en el corpus, que Villoro señala y rechaza. En el trabajo se examina y desecha la pretensión de validez de la teorí­a que propugna Villoro, y apoyándose en su aguda crí­tica a Descartes, se argumenta en contra de la interpretación canónica en su conjunto."œLuis Villoro and the cartesian canon of evidence"Orthodox or canonical understanding of cartesian philosophy supposes that, as the only way to resist extreme scepticism, Descartes advocates for intrinsically indubitable grounds for knowledge claims. In his book on Descartes, Luis Villoro investigates how these desiderata could possibly be satisfied in a rigorous way. He concludes with a substantive proposal, which according to himself, is plausibly expressed by some of Descartes"™ theories. These must be strictly separated from other, merely dogmatic doctrines present in the corpus. In this essay, I first subject to scrutiny the validity claim of the theory advocated by Villoro, and in a 2nd. section, starting from Villoro"™s analysis, argue in general against the canonical understanding of Descartes

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