The Appearance of Ignorance: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, Volume 2

Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press (2017)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Keith DeRose presents, develops, and defends original solutions to two of the stickiest problems in epistemology: skeptical hypotheses and the lottery problem. He deploys a powerful version of contextualism, the view that the epistemic standards for the attribution of knowledge vary with context.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,202

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

In Conversation with the Skeptic: Contextualism and the Raising of Standards.Daniele Sgaravatti - 2013 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3 (2):97-118.
Skepticism and Objective Contexts: A Critique of DeRose.Giovanni Mion - 2013 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3 (2):119-129.
An Argument for External World Skepticism from the Appearance/Reality Distinction.Moti Mizrahi - 2016 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6 (4):368-383.
Précis of The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, Vol. 1.Keith Derose - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):675-677.
Knowledge in and out of context.Kent Bach - 2007 - In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O.’Rourke & Harry S. Silverstein (eds.), Knowledge and Skepticism. MIT Press. pp. 105--36.
Skepticism and Contextualism.Michael Hannon - 2017 - In Jonathan Ichikawa (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism. Routledge. pp. 131--144.
Defending a sensitive neo-Moorean invariantism.Tim Black - 2007 - In Vincent Hendricks & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), New Waves in Epistemology. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 8--27.

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-02-20

Downloads
13 (#978,482)

6 months
6 (#431,022)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Keith DeRose
Yale University

Citations of this work

A‐Rational Epistemological Disjunctivism.Santiago Echeverri - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (3):692-719.
The Disappearance of Ignorance. [REVIEW]Robin McKenna - 2020 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 10 (1):4-20.
Books Received. [REVIEW][author unknown] - 2019 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 27 (1):125-130.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Rational endorsement.Will Fleisher - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2649-2675.
Safety, content, apriority, self-knowledge.David Manley - 2007 - Journal of Philosophy 104 (8):403-423.

Add more references