Prinz's problematic proxytypes

Philosophical Quarterly 55 (221):594-606 (2005)
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Abstract

Jesse Prinz has argued that a proxytype theory of concepts provides what he calls the 'intentionality' and 'cognitive content' desiderata better than any current competitor, and that the hybrid nature of proxytypes allows his theory to combine the informational component of informational atomism with the view that concepts are semantically structured entities. In response, I argue that the hybrid character of proxytypes, far from delivering the advantages Prinz claims, generates a threatening dilemma: either his theory is novel but fails to deliver the intentionality and cognitive content desiderata, or it delivers these desiderata but is not novel

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Raffaella De Rosa
Rutgers University - Newark

Citations of this work

First thoughts.Daniel A. Weiskopf - 2008 - Philosophical Psychology 21 (2):251 – 268.
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