On what there are

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 102 (2):183–200 (2002)
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Abstract

Is second-order quantification legitimate? For Quine, it was pure non-sense, unless construed as first-order quantification in disguise, ranging over sets. Boolos rightly maintained that it could be interpreted in terms of plural quantification, but claimed that it then ranged over the same individuals as singular, first-order quantification. I protest that plural quantification ranges over what I call multiplicities. But what is a 'multiplicity'? And does this idea itself not fall prey to something like Frege's paradox?

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Philippe De Rouilhan
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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The logic behind Quine's criterion of ontological commitment.Jeroen Smid - 2020 - European Journal of Philosophy 28 (3):789-804.

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