Now you know it, now you don’t

The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 5:91-106 (2000)
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Abstract

Resistance to contextualism comes in the form of many very different types of objections. My topic here is a certain group or family of related objections to contextualism that I call “Now you know it, now you don’t” objections. I responded to some such objections in my “Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions” a few years back. In what follows here, I will expand on that earlier response in various ways, and, in doing so, I will discuss some aspects of David Lewis’s recent paper, “Elusive Knowledge.”

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2009-01-28

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Keith DeRose
Yale University

Citations of this work

Assertion is weak.Matthew Mandelkern & Kevin Dorst - 2022 - Philosophers' Imprint 22.
Nonindexical contextualism.John MacFarlane - 2009 - Synthese 166 (2):231-250.
Must we know what we say?Matthew Weiner - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (2):227-251.
The Assessment Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions.John MacFarlane - 2005 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 197--234.
Knowledge Isn’t Closed on Saturday: A Study in Ordinary Language.Wesley Buckwalter - 2010 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (3):395-406.

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