Naturalismo y la autonomía del pensamiento filosófico: la epistemología naturalista de Quine en relación con la epistemología tradicional

Análisis Filosófico 19 (1):5-30 (1999)
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Abstract

"Epistemology Naturalized" has been extremely influential among contemporary analytical epistemologists. Current discussions about Quine's thesis do not pay attention to a basic point: his main argument is a historical one. Quine tries to show that a naturalized epistemology is the best way out vis-a-vis the failures of traditional epistemology. In this paper, I argue that Quine's argument is based on a fictions historical account. lf that is the case, his reasons for a naturalizcd epistemology are non-sutficient.

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Graciela De Pierris
Stanford University

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