Theoria 87 (5):1099-1122 (2021)

Julien Deonna
University of Geneva
Fabrice Teroni
University of Geneva
According to the fitting attitude (FA) analysis of value concepts, to conceive of an object as having a given value is to conceive of it as being such that a certain evaluative attitude taken towards it would be fitting. Among the challenges that this analysis has to face, two are especially pressing. The first is a psychological challenge: the FA analysis must call upon attitudes that shed light on our value concepts while not presupposing the mastery of these concepts. The second challenge is normative: the FA analysis must account for the fittingness of the relevant attitudes in terms of a kind of normativity intimately related to these attitudes, but again without presupposing the mastery of the relevant value concepts. In this paper, we show that real progress is possible if we pay close attention to the nature of the attitudes recruited by the analysis. More specifically, we claim that an FA analysis that appeals to emotions conceived as evaluative attitudes — as opposed to, for instance, evaluative judgements or evaluative perceptions — has the best prospects of meeting the two challenges and of putting the FA analysis on a strong footing.
Keywords emotions  fitting attitude analysis  thick value concepts
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DOI 10.1111/theo.12333
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References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2011 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Présentation.Julien Deonna & Fabrice Teroni - 2022 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 2:147-154.
Affective Sensibilities and Meliorative Value.Roberto Keller & Michele Davide Ombrato - 2022 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 2:155-171.

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