Real patterns

Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):27-51 (1991)

Abstract

Are there really beliefs? Or are we learning (from neuroscience and psychology, presumably) that, strictly speaking, beliefs are figments of our imagination, items in a superceded ontology? Philosophers generally regard such ontological questions as admitting just two possible answers: either beliefs exist or they don't. There is no such state as quasi-existence; there are no stable doctrines of semi-realism. Beliefs must either be vindicated along with the viruses or banished along with the banshees. A bracing conviction prevails, then, to the effect that when it comes to beliefs (and other mental items) one must be either a realist or an eliminative materialist

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Author's Profile

Daniel C. Dennett
Tufts University

References found in this work

What is Present to the Mind.Donald Davidson - 1991 - Philosophical Issues 1:197-213.
What is Present to the Mind?Donald Davidson - 1989 - In Grazer Philosophische Studien. Netherlands: Rodopi. pp. 197-213.
What is Present to the Mind?Donald Davidson - 1989 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 36 (1):3-18.
Patterns.Norton Nelkin - 1994 - Mind and Language 9 (1):56-87.

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