Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):27-51 (1991)
AbstractAre there really beliefs? Or are we learning (from neuroscience and psychology, presumably) that, strictly speaking, beliefs are figments of our imagination, items in a superceded ontology? Philosophers generally regard such ontological questions as admitting just two possible answers: either beliefs exist or they don't. There is no such state as quasi-existence; there are no stable doctrines of semi-realism. Beliefs must either be vindicated along with the viruses or banished along with the banshees. A bracing conviction prevails, then, to the effect that when it comes to beliefs (and other mental items) one must be either a realist or an eliminative materialist
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
References found in this work
What is Present to the Mind?Donald Davidson - 1989 - In Grazer Philosophische Studien. Netherlands: Rodopi. pp. 197-213.
Citations of this work
Attitude, Inference, Association: On the Propositional Structure of Implicit Bias.Eric Mandelbaum - 2016 - Noûs 50 (3):629-658.
Are More Details Better? On the Norms of Completeness for Mechanistic Explanations.Carl F. Craver & David M. Kaplan - 2020 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (1):287-319.
Time and the Observer: The Where and When of Consciousness in the Brain.Daniel C. Dennett & Marcel Kinsbourne - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):183-201.
Similar books and articles
Real Patterns and Real Problems: Making Dennett Respectable on Patterns and Beliefs.William S. Wilkerson - 1997 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 35 (4):557-70.
Mild Realism, Causation, and Folk Psychology.William S. Robinson - 1996 - Philosophical Psychology 8 (2):167-87.
Scientific Realism, Perceptual Beliefs, and Justification.Richard Otte - 1990 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990:393 - 404.
Contextual Realism: The Context-Dependency and the Relational Character of Beliefs.Albert Newen - 2001 - In Anthonie W. M. Meijers (ed.), Explaining Beliefs: Lynne Rudder Baker and Her Critics. CSLI Publications.
The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief.David Chalmers - 2003 - In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press. pp. 220--72.
Patterns Lost: Indeterminism and Dennett's Realism About Beliefs.B. Cohen - 1995 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 76 (1):17-31.