The logical underpinnings of intelligent design

Abstract

For many natural scientists, design, conceived as the action of an intelligent agent, is not a fundamental creative force in nature. Rather, material mechanisms, characterized by chance and necessity and ruled by unbroken laws, are thought sufficient to do all nature’s creating. Darwin’s theory epitomizes this rejection of design.

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Citations of this work

How-possibly explanations as genuine explanations and helpful heuristics: A comment on Forber.Thomas A. C. Reydon - 2012 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 43 (1):302-310.
Toward an Epistemology of Intellectual Property.Don Fallis - 2007 - Journal of Information Ethics 16 (2):34-51.

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References found in this work

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Investigations.Stuart A. Kauffman - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Conditionals.Frank Jackson - 1992 - Philosophical Quarterly 42 (167):266.

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