Reasons, Rationalization, and Rationality

Philosophia:1-25 (forthcoming)
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Abstract

In this paper, I provide an answer to the question “what is it for a reason to be the reason for which a belief is held?” After arguing against the causal account of the reason-for-which connection, I present what I call the rationalization account, according to which a reason R a subject S has for a belief P is the reason for which S holds P just in case R is the premise in S’s rationalization for P, where the argument from R to P becomes S’s rationalization in virtue of her endorsing it. In order to bring explicitly into view the version of the rationalization account I aim to argue for, I draw two distinctions, one between occurrent and dispositional endorsement and the other between personal and public endorsement. I show that the version of the rationalization account thus clarified receives intuitive support from various cases and survives some formidable objections that might be tempting to level against it.

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Erhan Demircioglu
Koc University

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References found in this work

Believing For a Reason.John Turri - 2011 - Erkenntnis 74 (3):383-397.
In-between believing.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (202):76-82.
Anomalous monism and the problem of explanatory force.Louise Antony - 1989 - Philosophical Review 98 (April):153-87.

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