Croatian Journal of Philosophy 16 (3):305-311 (2016)
AbstractIn this note, I would like to focus on the two central distinctions Inan draws between varieties of ignorance. One is the distinction between “objectual” and “propositional” ignorance, and the other is the distinction between “truth-ignorance” and “fact-ignorance,” which is a distinction between two types of propositional ignorance. According to Inan, appreciating these distinctions allow us to see what is wrong with the “received view,” according to which ignorance (or awareness of it) is “always about truth,” and enables us to “overcome our [philosophers’] propositional-bias.” I will argue for two theses. First, fact-ignorance appears to be a form of objectual ignorance; and, if this is so, there are no two distinctions but only one distinction that Inan in effect offers, which is between objectual and propositional ignorance. Second, what Inan calls “the received view” can raise some reasonable worries about objectual ignorance that are not taken into account by him.
Similar books and articles
Comments on Inan’s Notions of Objectual and Propositional Curiosity.Mirela Fuš - 2016 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 16 (3):313-325.
Ignorance is Lack of True Belief: A Rejoinder to Le Morvan.Rik Peels - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (2):345-355.
On the ignorance, knowledge, and nature of propositions.Pierre Le Morvan - 2015 - Synthese 192 (11):3647-3662.
What Kind of Ignorance Excuses? Two Neglected Issues.Rik Peels - 2014 - Philosophical Quarterly 64 (256):478-496.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
Afterthoughts on Critiques to The Philosophy of Curiosity.Ilhan Inan - 2016 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 16 (3):419-439.
References found in this work
No references found.