Human Cognitive Closure and Mysterianism: Reply to Kriegel
Acta Analytica 32 (1):125-132 (2017)
Abstract
In this paper, I respond to Kriegel’s criticism of McGinn’s mysterianism. Kriegel objects to a particular argument for the possibility of human cognitive closure and also gives a direct argument against mysterianism. I intend to show that neither the objection nor the argument is convincing.Author's Profile
DOI
10.1007/s12136-016-0295-y
My notes
Similar books and articles
The new mysterianism and the thesis of cognitive closure.Uriah Kriegel - 2003 - Acta Analytica 18 (30-31):177-191.
Cognitive Closure And Body-mind Problem In Mcginn’s Philosophy.Monika Szachniewicz - 2011 - Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia 6 (4):37-53.
Minds sans miracles: Colin McGinn's naturalized mysterianism.Robert K. Garcia - 2000 - Philosophia Christi 2 (2):227-242.
Is there a phenomenological argument for higher-order representationalism?Neil Mehta - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (2):357-370.
Argument z superweniencji a niekonstruktywny naturalizm.Mariusz Grygianiec - 2008 - Filozofia Nauki 3.
The limits of thought and the mind-body problem.David de Léon - 1995 - Lund University Cognitive Studies 42.
Mysterianism and Skepticism.Mario De Caro - 2009 - Iris. European Journal of Philosophy and Public Debate 1 (2):449-458.
In defense of self-representationalism: reply to critics.Uriah Kriegel - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 159 (3):475-484.
The Character of Mind: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind.Colin McGinn - 1996 - New York: Oxford University Press.
More on the paradox of the knower without epistemic closure.Charles B. Cross - 2004 - Mind 113 (449):109-114.
Analytics
Added to PP
2016-04-14
Downloads
193 (#67,196)
6 months
8 (#106,013)
2016-04-14
Downloads
193 (#67,196)
6 months
8 (#106,013)
Historical graph of downloads
Author's Profile
References found in this work
Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?Colin McGinn - 1989 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.
