Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 29 (2):268-274 (2022)
AbstractIn this paper, I aim to do three things. First, I introduce the distinction between the Uniqueness Thesis (U) and what I call the Conditional Uniqueness Thesis (U*). Second, I argue that despite their official advertisements, some prominent uniquers effectively defend U* rather than U. Third, some influential considerations that have been raised by the opponents of U misfire if they are interpreted as against U*. The moral is that an appreciation of the distinction between U and U* helps to clarify the contours of the uniqueness debate and to avoid a good deal of talking past each other.
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