Bertrand competition with asymmetric costs: a solution in pure strategies

Theory and Decision 87 (2):147-154 (2019)
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Abstract

We consider a Bertrand duopoly with homogeneous goods and we allow for asymmetric marginal costs. We derive the Myopic Stable Set in pure strategies as introduced by Demuynck et al.. In contrast to the set of Nash equilibria, the unique Myopic Stable Set can be easily characterized in closed form and it provides an intuitive set-valued prediction.

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