A Modest Intuitionist Reply to Greene's fMRI-Based Objections to Deontology

Southwest Philosophy Review 25 (1):107-117 (2009)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I argue that Greene’s research, although fascinating for many reasons, doesn’t undermine deontological moral philosophy. This is because both sentimentalist and rationalist moral epistemologies, applied to deontological value, predict exactly the data Greene has found. My discussion proceeds in three steps. In the first section I summarize Greene’s brief against deontology. In the second section I draw on standard accounts of moral emotions to suggest that there are ‘deontological emotions’ made rational by appearances of ‘deontological value.’ Finally, I outline a modest but realist intuitionist account of moral intuitions that connects deontological emotion to putative deontological value in a way that predicts Greene’s findings.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,616

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The secret joke of Kant’s soul.Joshua Greene - 2007 - In W. Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology, Vol. 3. MIT Press.
The reliability of moral intuitions: A challenge from neuroscience.Folke Tersman - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):389 – 405.
Moral Reasoning: Hints and Allegations.Joseph M. Paxton & Joshua D. Greene - 2010 - Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (3):511-527.
Moral cognition and computational theory.John Mikhail - 2008 - In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology Volume 3. MIT Press.
Graham Greene on the Moral Significance of Violence.Graham Greene - 2009 - The Chesterton Review 35 (1/2):279-282.
Multi-system moral psychology.Fiery Cushman, Liane Young & Joshua D. Greene - 2010 - In John M. Doris (ed.), Moral Psychology Handbook. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-01-09

Downloads
161 (#110,174)

6 months
1 (#1,042,085)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Dan Demetriou
University of Minnesota, Morris

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references