PSR

Philosophers' Imprint 10 (2010)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This paper presents an argument for the Principle of Sufficient Reason, the PSR, the principle according to which each thing that exists has an explanation. I begin with several widespread and extremely plausible arguments that I call explicability arguments in which a certain situation is rejected precisely because it would be arbitrary. Building on these plausible cases, I construct a series of explicability arguments that culminates in an explicability argument concerning existence itself. This argument amounts to the claim that the PSR is true. The plausibility of the initial cases in the series provides the basis of an argument for the PSR, an argument that can be rebutted only by drawing a line between the plausible early cases in the series and the apparently unacceptable later cases. I argue that no principled reason for drawing this line has been found and that one cannot draw an unprincipled or arbitrary line without begging the question. The paper concludes that, therefore, this defense of the PSR remains unrebutted and that we have a powerful, new reason to embrace the PSR

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,386

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

On the Principle of Sufficient Reason.Jacek Wojtysiak - 2007 - Polish Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):111-135.
Rationalism and Necessitarianism.Martin Lin - 2012 - Noûs 46 (3):418-448.
The recent revival of cosmological arguments.David Alexander - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (3):541–550.

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-12-29

Downloads
858 (#16,476)

6 months
138 (#23,263)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Michael Della Rocca
Yale University

Citations of this work

Lawful Persistence.David Builes & Trevor Teitel - 2022 - Philosophical Perspectives 36 (1):5-30.
Indefinitely Descending Ground.Einar Duenger Bohn - 2018 - In Ricki Bliss & Graham Priest (eds.), Reality and its Structure: Essays in Fundamentality. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 167-181.
Explaining contingent facts.Fatema Amijee - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (4):1163-1181.
Locke on Persons and Personal Identity.Ruth Boeker - 2021 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Against simplicity.M. B. Willard - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (1):165-181.

View all 32 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references