Abstract

This dissertation aims to situate Aquinas' conception of the virtues within the theological framework of his thought by examining the relationship between the natural and the theological virtues in the Summa Theologiae. My thesis is that the frequent attempt at abstracting Aquinas' ethics from its theological context risks a failure to appreciate the richness of his doctrine of the virtues. An overview of Aquinas' doctrine of the virtues is presented in terms of the perfection or complete development of the self, a perfection that requires both natural and theological virtues. The problem of how Aquinas can include two separate orders of virtue, natural and supernatural, within his ethical theory without producing a fragmented moral self arises as a challenge his doctrine of the virtues must meet. It is suggested that Aquinas connects these two orders of virtue through a theologically rich enough conception of the good to allow for both a "natural" fulfillment of the ultimate end of the human being as well as a "supernatural" fulfillment, with the natural end nested within, and subordinated to, the supernatural end. Under this interpretation, the ultimate end of the human being is one, namely the divine goodness, which the human being realizes in a twofold form of participation: "remotely" through his or her natural abilities; and "directly" or "intimately" through divine grace. The complete perfection of the human being would then require the theological or infused virtues, principally the virtue of charity, as well as the naturally acquired virtues, principally prudence. Yet it is charity that is primary in the life of virtue since it enables the self to participate most fully in the divine goodness, and directs all the other virtues, including the natural virtues of the person in the state of grace, to this ultimate end. Concluding reflections suggest that Aquinas' metaphysically robust account of the virtues, or something very much like it, fares better than more recent metaphysically austere attempts to retrieve an ethics of virtue since such an account satisfies what Charles Taylor has argued is required of a coherent notion of the self, namely, an orientation to what may be called a "deep" conception of the good