A Logic For Reasoning About Responsibility

Logic Journal of the IGPL 18 (1):99-117 (2010)
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Abstract

One way to allocate tasks to agents is by ascribing them obligations. From obligations to be, agents are able to infer what are the forbidden, permitted and obligatory actions they may perform, by using the well-known Meyer’s reduction from obligations to be to obligations to do. However, we show through an example that this method is not completely adequate to guide agents’ decisions. We then propose a solution using, instead of obligations, the concept of ‘responsibility’. To formalise responsibility we use a multiagent extension of propositional dynamic logic as framework, and then we define some basic concepts, such as ‘agent ability’, also briefly discussing the problem of uniform strategies and a possible solution. In the last part, we show that our framework can be used in the specification of normative multiagent systems, by presenting an extensive running example

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Frank Dignum
Utrecht University

Citations of this work

Counterfactual and seeing-to-it responsibilities in strategic games.Pavel Naumov & Jia Tao - 2023 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 174 (10):103353.
Blame it on me.Lambèr Royakkers & Jesse Hughes - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 49 (2):315-349.

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