Philo 9 (2):165-191 (2006)

Abstract
Do any significant philosophical differences between Quine and Carnap follow from Quine’s rejection of Carnap’s analytic-synthetic distinction? Not if they both understand empirical evidence in merely observational terms. But it follows from Quine’s rejection of the distinction that empirical evidence has degrees of holophrastic depth penetrating even into logic and ontology. Thus his reasons to prefer realism to idealism are holophrastically empirical. I discuss Quine’s holist sectarian realism on private languages, externalism versus internalism, unobserved objects, unobservable abstract entities, bivalence, ecumenicism versus sectarianism, and on gradualism itself.
Keywords Philosophy and Religion
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s) 1098-3570
DOI philo20069213
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 70,337
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

On Quine on Carnap on Ontology.Marc Alspector-Kelly - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 102 (1):93 - 122.
Empirical Equivalence in the Quine-Carnap Debate.Eric J. Loomis - 2006 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (4):499–508.
Putting the Bite Back Into 'Two Dogmas'.Paul Gregory - 2003 - Principia 7 (1-2):115-129.
Dear Carnap, Dear Van. W. V. Quine and Rudolf Carnap. [REVIEW]Thomas Uebel - 1993 - Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook 1:251-254.
‘Two Dogmas’ -- All Bark and No Bite?: Carnap and Quine on Analyticity.Paul A. Gregory - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):633–648.
Quine, Analyticity and Philosophy of Mathematics.John P. Burgess - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (214):38–55.
Carnap and Quine on Empiricism.Robert Almeder - 1997 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 14 (3):349 - 364.
Quine, I.Elliott Sober - 2000 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74 (1):237–280.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2011-01-09

Total views
39 ( #291,224 of 2,507,888 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #416,715 of 2,507,888 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes