Bad Concepts, Bilateral Contents

Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 8:595-614 (2022)
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Abstract

I argue that one need not be an inferentialist in order to model inconsistent concepts, contrary to what some have thought. Representationalists can do so by adopting a form of bilateralism about contents. It remains unclear, however, why conceptual inconsistency would constitute a defect to be eliminated, rather than a vindication of dialetheism to be embraced. I suggest some answers to explore that involve accepting a descriptive form of dialetheism but denying its normative forms.

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Michael Deigan
Freie Universität Berlin

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