Abstract

In this article an attempt is made of presenting the deontological feature of A Theory of Justice under a new light. Through an exploration of the meaning of the priority of the good over the right and of the significance and function of the argument of the congruence between justice and individual good, the differences between teleology and deontology are displayed. Deontology seems to have several advantages: a) it allows for pluralism of values and a richer and deeper understanding of practical reason, b) is rooted in a very compelling account of agency, c) points towards an attractive conception of value. Besides, once it is properly understood that the normative content of justice as fairness is to be applied strictly only to an ideal situation and cannot be taken as straightforwardly action-guiding in the real world, we are led to an understanding of deontology that parts from ethical absolutism, makes room for a proper consideration of consequences and avoids the stiffness often imputed to deontological theories. Finally it is suggested that the development of a normative conception of character along Rawlsian lines offers promising prospects towards a proper balancing between an ethic of conviction and an ethic of responsibility.