Above suspicion: Cognitive and intentional aspects of the ability to lie

Argumentation 2 (1):77-87 (1988)
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Abstract

This paper looks at the attribution of the ability to lie and not at lying or lies. It also departs from more familiar approaches by focussing on the appraisal of an ability and not on the ability in itself. We believe that this attribution perspective is required to bring out the cognitive and intentional basis of the ability to lie.

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