Philosophical Studies 174 (5):1255-1276 (2017)

Authors
Oisín Deery
York University
Eddy Nahmias
Georgia State University
Abstract
We use recent interventionist theories of causation to develop a compatibilist account of causal sourcehood, which provides a response to Manipulation Arguments for the incompatibility of free will and determinism. Our account explains the difference between manipulation and determinism, against the claim of Manipulation Arguments that there is no relevant difference. Interventionism allows us to see that causal determinism does not mean that variables outside of the agent causally explain her actions better than variables within the agent, whereas the causal source of a manipulated agent’s actions instead lies outside of the agent in the intentions of the manipulator. As a result, determined agents can have free will and be morally responsible in a way that manipulated agents cannot, contrary to what Manipulation Arguments conclude. In this way, our account demonstrates not only how Manipulation Arguments fail but also how compatibilism can be strengthened by means of a plausible account of causal sourcehood.
Keywords free will  compatibilism  interventionism
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-016-0754-8
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References found in this work BETA

Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.Harry Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
Causality: Models, Reasoning and Inference.Judea Pearl - 2000 - Cambridge University Press.
An Essay on Free Will.Peter Van Inwagen - 1983 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Skepticism About Moral Responsibility.Gregg D. Caruso - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2018):1-81.
The Objects of Moral Responsibility.Andrew Khoury - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (6):1357-1381.
Free Actions as a Natural Kind.Oisín Deery - 2021 - Synthese 198 (1):823-843.
Free Will as a Psychological Accomplishment.Eddy Nahmias - 2016 - In David Schmidtz & Carmen Pavel (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Freedom. Oxford University Press.

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