Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):233-249 (2015)

Authors
Helen De Cruz
Saint Louis University
Abstract
Intuitions play a central role in analytic philosophy, but their psychological basis is little understood. This paper provides an empirically-informed, psychological char- acterization of philosophical intuitions. Drawing on McCauley’s distinction between maturational and practiced naturalness, I argue that philosophical intuitions originate from several early-developed, specialized domains of core knowledge (maturational naturalness). Eliciting and deploying such intuitions in argumentative contexts is the domain of philosophical expertise, thus philosophical intuitions are also practiced nat- ural. This characterization has implications for the evidential value of philosophical intuitions, as well as for the interpretation of studies in experimental philosophy.
Keywords Philosophical Intuitions  Dual processing  Philosophical expertise  Experimental philosophy
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Reprint years 2015
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DOI 10.1080/00048402.2014.967792
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References found in this work BETA

The Origin of Concepts.Susan Carey - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
Philosophy Without Intuitions.Herman Cappelen - 2012 - Oxford University Press UK.
Realism, Mathematics and Modality.Hartry Field - 1988 - Philosophical Topics 16 (1):57-107.
Mathematical Truth.Paul Benacerraf - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (19):661-679.

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Citations of this work BETA

Intuitive Expertise and Intuitions About Knowledge.Joachim Horvath & Alex Wiegmann - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2701-2726.
Reflective Reasoning & Philosophy.Nick Byrd - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (11):e12786.
Facts, Principles, and (Real) Politics.Enzo Rossi - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (2):505-520.
Philosophical Expertise Beyond Intuitions.Anna Drożdżowicz - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (2):253-277.

View all 22 citations / Add more citations

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