Quaestio 12:503-513 (2012)
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According to some philosophers, philosophical realism is an obsolete, specious and irrelevant conceptio. In this essay I argue that this thesis is deeply flawed because the issue of realism is philosophically inescapable. Then I discuss two versions of philosophical realism that are particularly widespread today: common sense realism and scientific realism. These conceptions tend to be hegemonic, and consequently often in conflict with each other. The biggest challenge for philosophical realism over the next few years will be to try and harmonize them
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DOI | 10.1484/J.QUAESTIO.1.103626 |
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