Authors
Igor Douven
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Lieven Decock
VU University Amsterdam
Abstract
Color qualia inversion scenarios have played a key role in various philosophical debates. Most notably perhaps, they have figured in skeptical arguments for the fundamental unknowability of other persons’ color experiences. For these arguments to succeed, it must be assumed that a person's having inverted color qualia may go forever unnoticed. This assumption is now generally deemed to be implausible. The present paper defines a variant of color qualia inversion—termed ‘‘color qualia compression’’—and argues that the possibility of undetectable color qualia compression is immune to the objections that have been levelled against color qualia inversion arguments, and that color qualia compression scenarios support full-blown skepticism regarding other people's color experiences
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy of Mind
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ISBN(s) 0031-8205
DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00545.x
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References found in this work BETA

Basic Color Terms: Their Universality and Evolution.Brent Berlin & Paul Kay - 1991 - Center for the Study of Language and Information.
Inverted Earth.Ned Block - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:53-79.
Color Realism and Color Science.Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):3-21.
Sensory Qualities.Austen Clark - 1992 - Clarendon Press.

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A New Inverted Spectrum Thought Experiment.Richard Montgomery - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (8):1963-1983.

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