Tacitly Loaded Concepts ( Multiverse Prior to Cognition)

Oxford: (2020)
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Abstract

Human beings employ concepts not merely to re-constitute their worlds, realities, including their selves, minds, consciousness, lives and loves but to fabricate and constitute these things. .Concepts, conceptual practices, usage and meanings are loaded and associated with predetermined -isms, presuppositions, assumptions, attitudes, beliefs, restrictions, perspectives, frames of reference, and other phenomena that will determine how they are used, their effects, results, consequences, etc. Concepts, conceptual practices, usage and meanings are loaded and associated with pre-determined -isms, pre-suppositions, assumptions, attitudes, beliefs, restrictions, perspectives, frames of reference, and other phenomena that will determine how they are used, their effects, results, consequences, etc. The above is earth- and anthropo-centered and restricted. The origins, nature, past, present and future is explored. This is suggested as point of reference and not the minute and irrelevant planet earth. Changes, modifications even the destruction of this planet will have little effect on and consequences for our galaxy and the universe. Against or in this universal context the nature, the functions, aims, objectives, methods, techniques, relevance, meaning and possibility of philosophy and philo- sophizing is explored. Reductionistic humans are obsessed with and drawn to minimalist and generalized patterns or sets and systems of ideas as explanations and underlying foundations of complex realities and phenomena.

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That What Is - more meaningful.Ulrich de Balbian - 2019 - London: Academic Publishers.

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Ulrich De Balbian
Meta-Philosophy Research Centre

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