Synthese 176 (2):177 - 225 (2010)

Hidenori Kurokawa
City University of New York
The Knowability Paradox purports to show that the controversial but not patently absurd hypothesis that all truths are knowable entails the implausible conclusion that all truths are known. The notoriety of this argument owes to the negative light it appears to cast on the view that there can be no verification-transcendent truths. We argue that it is overly simplistic to formalize the views of contemporary verificationists like Dummett, Prawitz or Martin-Löf using the sort of propositional modal operators which are employed in the original derivation of the Paradox. Instead we propose that the central tenet of verificationism is most accurately formulated as follows: if φ is true, then there exists a proof of φ Building on the work of Artemov (Bull Symb Log 7(1): 1-36, 2001), a system of explicit modal logic with proof quantifiers is introduced to reason about such statements. When the original reasoning of the Paradox is developed in this setting, we reach not a contradiction, but rather the conclusion that there must exist non-constructed proofs. This outcome is evaluated relative to the controversy between Dummett and Prawitz about proof existence and bivalence
Keywords Knowability Paradox  Fitch  Verificationism  Intuitionistic logic  BHK interpretation  Existence predicate  Logic of proofs  Potential proof  Bivalence
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-009-9490-3
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References found in this work BETA

The Logical Basis of Metaphysics.Michael Dummett - 1991 - Harvard University Press.
Elements of Intuitionism.Michael Dummett - 1977 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Logic of Justification.Sergei Artemov - 2008 - Review of Symbolic Logic 1 (4):477-513.
Justification Logic.Sergei Artemov - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Tracking Reasons with Extensions of Relevant Logics.Shawn Standefer - 2019 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 27 (4):543-569.

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