The No Miracles Argument without Scientific Realism

Abstract

According to the no miracles argument, scientific realism provides the only satisfactory explanation of the predictive success of science. It is argued in the present article that a different explanatory strategy, based on the posit of strong limitations to the underdetermination of scientific theory building by the available empirical data, offers a more convincing understanding of scientific success.

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Richard Dawid
Stockholm University

Citations of this work

Escaping the Fundamental Dichotomy of Scientific Realism.Shahin Kaveh - 2023 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 74 (4):999-1025.

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References found in this work

The aim and structure of physical theory.Pierre Maurice Marie Duhem - 1954 - Princeton,: Princeton University Press.
A confutation of convergent realism.Larry Laudan - 1981 - Philosophy of Science 48 (1):19-49.
A Confutation of Convergent Realism.Larry Laudan - 1980 - In Yuri Balashov & Alexander Rosenberg (eds.), Philosophy of Science: Contemporary Readings. Routledge. pp. 211.
String Theory and the Scientific Method.Richard Dawid - 2013 - Cambridge University Press.
What is Mathematical Truth?Hilary Putnam - 1975 - In Mathematics, Matter and Method. Cambridge University Press. pp. 60--78.

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