Against the empirical viability of the Deutsch–Wallace–Everett approach to quantum mechanics

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 47:55-61 (2014)
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Abstract

The subjective Everettian approach to quantum mechanics presented by Deutsch and Wallace fails to constitute an empirically viable theory of quantum phenomena. The decision theoretic implementation of the Born rule realized in this approach provides no basis for rejecting Everettian quantum mechanics in the face of empirical data that contradicts the Born rule. The approach of Greaves and Myrvold, which provides a subjective implementation of the Born rule as well but derives it from empirical data rather than decision theoretic arguments, avoids the problem faced by Deutsch and Wallace and is empirically viable. However, there is good reason to cast doubts on its scientific value

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Author Profiles

Karim Thebault
University of Bristol
Richard Dawid
Stockholm University

References found in this work

Quantum Theory of Probability and Decisions.David Deutsch - 1999 - Proceedings of the Royal Society of London:3129--37.
Quantum probability from subjective likelihood: Improving on Deutsch's proof of the probability rule.David Wallace - 2007 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 38 (2):311-332.
Measurement outcomes and probability in Everettian quantum mechanics.David J. Baker - 2007 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 38 (1):153-169.
Evidence and Uncertainty in Everett’s Multiverse.Paul Tappenden - 2011 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (1):99-123.

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