What Use Is Empirical Confirmation?

Economics and Philosophy 12 (2):197 (1996)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

1. Despite the plain fact that there is nothing in this world that can be proved without reliance on some assumption or another, there is an inalienable difference between an argument that begins by assuming what it is designed to establish and one that begins by assuming the contradictory of what it is designed to establish. Arguments of the first kind are uncontroversially acknowledged to be circular, or question-begging; though valid they achieve nothing. Those of the second kind conform to the classical pattern of reductio ad absurdum or indirect proof. A typical example is the proof of the irrationality of √2, which begins by assuming that for some integral m, n the identity m2/n2 = 2, and arrives at a contradiction. Nothing whatever is established or justified by arguments of the first kind, even granted the truth of all the other assumptions, and the validity of the rules of inference; while the second may establish that, if those assumptions are true, then the additional assumption is false

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,386

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

What Is the Point of Confirmation?Franz Huber - 2005 - Philosophy of Science 72 (5):1146-1159.
Confirmation of ecological and evolutionary models.Elisabeth A. Lloyd - 1987 - Biology and Philosophy 2 (3):277-293.
From relative confirmation to real confirmation.Aron Edidin - 1988 - Philosophy of Science 55 (2):265-271.
Choosing between confirmation theories.R. G. Swinburne - 1970 - Philosophy of Science 37 (4):602-613.
Empirical and Rational Components in Scientific Confirmation.Abner Shimony - 1994 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:146 - 155.
Confirmation theory.James Hawthorne - 2011 - In Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay & Malcolm Forster (eds.), Handbook of the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 7: Philosophy of Statistics. Elsevier.

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-08-10

Downloads
23 (#666,649)

6 months
4 (#800,606)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

David Miller
Nuffield College, Oxford University

Citations of this work

The Objectives of Science1.David Miller - 2007 - Philosophia Scientiae 11 (1):21-43.
Against the So-called ‘Standard Account of Method’.Rod Thomas - 2014 - Philosophy of Management 13 (1):43-72.
An ‘Inexact’ Philosophy of Economics?Roger E. Backhouse - 1997 - Economics and Philosophy 13 (1):25-37.
Economics as Separate and Inexact.Daniel M. Hausman - 1996 - Economics and Philosophy 12 (2):207-220.

Add more citations

References found in this work

A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive.John Stuart Mill - 1843 - New York and London,: University of Toronto Press. Edited by J. Robson.
Logik der Forschung.Karl Popper - 1934 - Erkenntnis 5 (1):290-294.
Realism and the Aim of Science.Karl R. Popper & W. W. Bartley - 1983 - Philosophy of Science 50 (4):669-671.
The Philosophy of Karl Popper.Karl Raimund Popper - 1974 - Open Court Publishing Company.

View all 9 references / Add more references