Will as commitment and resolve: an existential account of creativity, love, virtue, and happiness

New York: Fordham University Press (2007)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In contemporary philosophy, the will is often regarded as a sheer philosophical fiction. In Will as Commitment and Resolve , Davenport argues not only that the will is the central power of human agency that makes decisions and forms intentions but also that it includes the capacity to generate new motivation different in structure from prepurposive desires. The concept of "projective motivation" is the central innovation in Davenport's existential account of the everyday notion of striving will. Beginning with the contrast between "eastern" and "western" attitudes toward assertive willing, Davenport traces the lineage of the idea of projective motivation from NeoPlatonic and Christian conceptions of divine motivation to Scotus, Kant, Marx, Arendt, and Levinas. Rich with historical detail, this book includes an extended examination of Platonic and Aristotelian eudaimonist theories of human motivation. Drawing on contemporary critiques of egoism, Davenport argues that happiness is primarily a byproduct of activities and pursuits aimed at other agent-transcending goods for their own sake. In particular, the motives involved in virtue and in its practice as understood by Alasdair MacIntyre are projective rather than eudaimonist. This theory is supported by analyses of radical evil, accounts of intrinsic motivation in existential psychology, and contemporary theories of identity-forming commitment in analytic moral psychology. Following Viktor Frankl, Joseph Raz, and others, Davenport argues that Harry Frankfurt's conception of caring requires objective values worth caring about, which serve as rational grounds for projecting new final ends. The argument concludes with a taxonomy of values or goods, devotion to which can make life meaningful for us

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,386

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Beyond virtue: integrity and morality.Hayden Ramsay - 1997 - New York: St. Martin's Press.
Happiness and the Willing Agent.Bonnie Kent - 2004 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 78:59-70.
Hegel’s Critique of Kant’s Moral World View.Kenneth R. Westphal - 1991 - Philosophical Topics 19 (2):133-176.
Intrinsic value and meaningful life.Robert Audi - 2005 - Philosophical Papers 34 (3):331-355.
Kant on Happiness in the Moral Life.Gary Watson - 1983 - Philosophy Research Archives 9:79-108.
Intelligent Virtue.Julia Annas - 2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
The Virtues of God and the Foundations of Ethics.Linda Zagzebski - 1998 - Faith and Philosophy 15 (4):538-553.
The motivational state of the virtuous agent.Lorraine Besser-Jones - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (1):93 - 108.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
41 (#379,234)

6 months
9 (#290,637)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

John J. Davenport
Fordham University

Citations of this work

Demonic despair under the guise of the good? Kierkegaard and Anscombe vs. Velleman.Roe Fremstedal - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (5):705-725.
Character, Will, and Agency.Roman Altshuler - 2016 - In Alberto Masala & Jonathan Webber (eds.), From Personality to Virtue: Essays on the Philosophy of Character. Oxford: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 62-80.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
Internal and External Reasons.Bernard Williams - 1979 - In Ross Harrison (ed.), Rational action: studies in philosophy and social science. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 101-113.
Virtue and Reason.John Mcdowell - 1979 - The Monist 62 (3):331-350.
Free agency.Gary Watson - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (April):205-20.

View all 102 references / Add more references