Two points of contact are explored between contemporary philosophy of science and Dialectical Materialism. The first point deals with the interaction view of metaphor as an exemplification of the law of the unity of opposites. The contradiction is then noted between the strategy and tactics of much analytical philosophy and the lesson to be learnt from this account of metaphor. The concern to change category habits into category disciplines rules out the process of conceptual change of the interaction view. G. A. Paul's dismissal of Lenin's theory of reflection is then criticized in the light of the interaction view
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DOI 10.1080/00201747108601642
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References found in this work BETA

The Nature of Explanation.Kenneth James Williams Craik - 1943 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cognitive Maps in Rats and Men.Edward C. Tolman - 1948 - Psychological Review 55 (4):189-208.

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History and Philosophy of Science Takes Form.Warwick Anderson - 2022 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 93:175-182.
The Rhetoric of Modern Economics.Mirowski Philip - 1990 - History of the Human Sciences 3 (2):243-257.

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