The dynamical hypothesis: The role of biological constraints on cognition

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (5):636-636 (1998)
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Abstract

For the dynamical hypothesis to be defended as a viable alternative to a computational perspective on natural cognition, the role of biological constraints needs to be considered. This task requires a detailed understanding of the structural organization and function of the dynamic nervous system, as well as a theoretical approach that grounds cognitive activity within the constraints of organism and ecological context.

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