On Occurrences of Types in Types

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (2):349-363 (2014)
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Abstract

The different occurrences of a word in a sentence cannot be identified with the one word type, nor with its many tokens. What then are occurrences of a word? How can one type occur more than once in another type? Is the conception of ‘structural universals’ that leads to these questions incoherent, as Lewis maintained? I argue against the answer Wetzel suggested, which identifies sentences with functions from numbers to expressions, and propose instead that occurrences of one type in another are subtypes with different relative positions in the whole. Types have subtypes as well as tokens. Occurrences in non-symmetrical types like sequences are individuated by their relative positions in the type. Occurrences in a symmetrical whole have different positions but stand in the same relations to the other components. They are numerically different subtypes that do not differ from each other qualitatively.

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Wayne Davis
Georgetown University

Citations of this work

Properties.Francesco Orilia & Michele Paolini Paoletti - 2020 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Propositions as Structured Cognitive Event‐Types.Wayne A. Davis - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (3):665-692.
Linguistic types are capacity-individuated action-types.Fintan Mallory - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (9-10):1123-1148.
The Grounds and the Components of Concepts.Jan Claas - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (6):2409-2429.

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References found in this work

Counterfactuals.David K. Lewis - 1973 - Malden, Mass.: Blackwell.
Universals and scientific realism.David Malet Armstrong - 1978 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
What numbers could not be.Paul Benacerraf - 1965 - Philosophical Review 74 (1):47-73.
The identity of indiscernibles.Max Black - 1952 - Mind 61 (242):153-164.
Mathematical logic.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1951 - Cambridge,: Harvard University Press.

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