Delusion: Cognitive Approaches—Bayesian Inference and Compartmentalisation

&
In K. W. M. Fulford, Martin Davies, Richard G. T. Gipps, George Graham, John Z. Sadler, Giovanni Stanghellini & Tim Thornton (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry. Oxford University Press. pp. 689-727 (2013)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Cognitive approaches contribute to our understanding of delusions by providing an explanatory framework that extends beyond the personal level to the sub personal level of information-processing systems. According to one influential cognitive approach, two factors are required to account for the content of a delusion, its initial adoption as a belief, and its persistence. This chapter reviews Bayesian developments of the two-factor framework.

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,322

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

Abductive inference and delusional belief.Max Coltheart, Peter Menzies & John Sutton - 2010 - Cognitive Neuropsychiatry 15 (1):261-287.
The Role of Unconscious Inference in Models of Delusion Formation.Federico Bongiorno & Lisa Bortolotti - 2019 - In Anders Nes & Timothy Hoo Wai Chan (eds.), Inference and Consciousness. London: Routledge. pp. 74-97.
Confirmation in the Cognitive Sciences: The Problematic Case of Bayesian Models. [REVIEW]Frederick Eberhardt & David Danks - 2011 - Minds and Machines 21 (3):389-410.
Parameter Inference for Computational Cognitive Models with Approximate Bayesian Computation.Antti Kangasrääsiö, Jussi P. P. Jokinen, Antti Oulasvirta, Andrew Howes & Samuel Kaski - 2019 - Cognitive Science 43 (6):e12738.
Is There a Free Lunch in Inference?Jeffrey N. Rouder, Richard D. Morey, Josine Verhagen, Jordan M. Province & Eric-Jan Wagenmakers - 2016 - Topics in Cognitive Science 8 (3):520-547.
Seeing the wood for the trees: philosophical aspects of classical, Bayesian and likelihood approaches in statistical inference and some implications for phylogenetic analysis.Daniel Barker - 2015 - Biology and Philosophy 30 (4):505-525.
Delusional Inference.Ryan McKay - 2012 - Mind and Language 27 (3):330-355.
Bayesian Models, Delusional Beliefs, and Epistemic Possibilities.Matthew Parrott - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (1):271-296.
Pragmatism and the pragmatic turn in cognitive science.Richard Menary - 2016 - In Karl Friston, Andreas Andreas & Danika Kragic (eds.), Pragmatism and the Pragmatic Turn in Cognitive Science. M.I.T. Press. pp. 219-236.
Survival in a world of probable objects: A fundamental reason for Bayesian enlightenment.Shimon Edelman & Reza Shahbazi - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (4):197-198.
Bayesian Cognitive Science, Monopoly, and Neglected Frameworks.Matteo Colombo & Stephan Hartmann - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (2):451–484.
An analytic view of delusion.Paul Franceschi - 2002
Logical relations in a statistical problem.Jon Williamson, Jan-Willem Romeijn, Rolf Haenni & Gregory Wheeler - 2008 - In Benedikt Lowe, Jan-Willem Romeijn & Eric Pacuit (eds.), Foundations of the Formal Sciences Vi: Probabilistic Reasoning and Reasoning With Probabilities. Studies in Logic. College Publications.
Direct inference and probabilistic accounts of induction.Jon Williamson - 2023 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 54 (3):451-472.
Interpreting Silent Gesture: Cognitive Biases and Rational Inference in Emerging Language Systems.Marieke Schouwstra, Henriëtte de Swart & Bill Thompson - 2019 - Cognitive Science 43 (7):e12732.

Analytics

Added to PP
2022-04-07

Downloads
17 (#843,162)

6 months
12 (#203,353)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Andy Egan
Rutgers University - New Brunswick
Martin Davies

Citations of this work

Delusion.Lisa Bortolotti - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Transparent Delusion.Vladimir Krstić - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (1):183-201.
Extended belief and extended knowledge.Åsa Wikforss - 2014 - Philosophical Issues 24 (1):460-481.

View all 11 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references