A response to Charles Larmore
AbstractIn his contribution to a recent symposium on Habermas's work, (1) Charles Larmore critiques Habermas's Between Facts and Norms (2) from a largely Rawlsian perspective. His reading raises fundamental questions that divide Habermas from American pragmatists and other contextualists, and helps reveal, in my view, that the differences between Habermas's and Rawls's conceptions of justice are more basic than is often recognized. Yet as I will argue, in several places Larmore misconstrues Habermas's position and fails to understand his point at crucial junctures, largely because he attempts to discuss..
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