The Role of the Distinction Between Method and Principle and the Place of Common Sense Morality in Henry Sidgwick's "the Methods of Ethics"

Dissertation, The Claremont Graduate University (1994)
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Abstract

In Henry Sidgwick's taxonomy in The Methods of Ethics, a method is a rational procedure for generating rules for right action, a principle is the statement of the ultimate good, and both these elements combine to form the moral theory, which shows the connection between the rules for right action to the good achieved by acting on those rules. Any method can be matched to any principle, but only satisfactory theories connect methods and principles plausibly or logically. ;Rightness, the proper end of a method, is the proper end for agents as such; the rules generated by the method need not be linked by them to the goods. A method of generating rules of rightness is all there is to the moral theory of Jural Intuitionism, which is correct as far as it goes. But theorists need more than rules for rightness; they also need the standard of the good on which rightness depends. Philosophical Intuitionists know rightness depends on goodness, but misidentify that good as individual excellence. Jural Intuitionists correctly identify the aimed-at end for agents, rightness; Philosophical Intuitionists correctly link rightness to goodness. ;Common Sense Morality is sufficient for agents, who unconsciously identify the good as Utilitarians do, namely, as universal happiness. Common Sense Morality provides the data for fashioning a hybrid moral theory. That theory links the Egoist, Intuitionist, and Utilitarian methods to the Utilitarian principle. Sidgwick thinks he has shown that the Intuitionist and Utilitarian methods do, but the Egoist method does not, serve the Utilitarian end. Thus the moral theory on which Common Sense Morality is founded fails. Moral philosophy betrays a Dualism of Practical Reason, wherein the rational ends of individual happiness and universal happiness require conflicting rules for action. ;Pace Sidgwick, the Intuitionist method does not serve the Utilitarian end: Intuitionism requires that one believe both that rightness does and does not have intrinsic value. There is another problem: Sidgwick is biased, since for him only consequentialism is a moral theory. Finally, Sidgwick fails because he is committed both to Common Sense Morality and precision, and expects more systematization than morality allows

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Janice Daurio
Moorpark College

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