Nilanjan Das
University College London
In this essay, I cast doubt on an apparent truism: namely, that if evidence is available for gathering and use at a negligible cost, then it's always instrumentally rational for us to gather that evidence and use it for making decisions. Call this thesis Value of Information. I show that Value of Information conflicts with two other plausible theses. The first is the view that an agent's evidence can entail non-trivial propositions about the external world. The second is the view that epistemic rationality requires us to update our credences by conditionalization. These two theses, given some plausible assumptions, make room for rationally biased inquiries where Value of Information fails. I go on to argue that this is bad news for defenders of Value of Information.
Keywords externalism  conditionalization  negative introspection  positive introspection
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DOI 10.1093/bjps/axaa003
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References found in this work BETA

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