Review of Symbolic Logic 12 (1):62-96 (2019)

Authors
Nilanjan Das
University College London
Abstract
Recently, several epistemologists have defended an attractive principle of epistemic rationality, which we shall call Ur-Prior Conditionalization. In this essay, I ask whether we can justify this principle by appealing to the epistemic goal of accuracy. I argue that any such accuracy-based argument will be in tension with Evidence Externalism, i.e., the view that agent's evidence may entail non-trivial propositions about the external world. This is because any such argument will crucially require the assumption that, independently of all empirical evidence, it is rational for an agent to be certain that her evidence will always include truths, and that she will always have perfect introspective access to her own evidence. This assumption is in tension with Evidence Externalism. I go on to suggest that even if we don't accept Evidence Externalism, the prospects for any accuracy-based justification for Ur-Prior Conditionalization are bleak.
Keywords accuracy  conditionalization  externalism
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1017/s1755020318000035
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 69,089
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Attitudes de Dicto and de Se.David Lewis - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (4):513-543.
The Skeptic and the Dogmatist.James Pryor - 2000 - Noûs 34 (4):517–549.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
Warrant for Nothing (and Foundations for Free)?Crispin Wright - 2004 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78 (1):167–212.

View all 65 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Externalism and Exploitability.Nilanjan Das - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (1):101-128.
The Value of Biased Information.Nilanjan Das - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axaa003.
Accurate Updating for the Risk Sensitive.Catrin Campbell-Moore & Bernhard Salow - 2020 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axaa006.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Defeasible Conditionalization.Paul D. Thorn - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (2-3):283-302.
Understanding Conditionalization.Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5):767-797.
Reflecting on Finite Additivity.Leendert Huisman - 2015 - Synthese 192 (6):1785-1797.
Conditionalization, Reflection, and Self-Knowledge.Jonathan Weisberg - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 135 (2):179-197.
Conditionalization and Essentially Indexical Credence.Joel Pust - 2012 - Journal of Philosophy 109 (4):295-315.
Generalized Probabilism: Dutch Books and Accuracy Domi- Nation.J. Robert G. Williams - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (5):811-840.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2018-02-06

Total views
147 ( #78,481 of 2,499,012 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #170,045 of 2,499,012 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes