“Ought” implies “can”, or, the moral relevance of a theory of the firm

Journal of Business Ethics 7 (1-2):23 - 28 (1988)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Since ought implies can, i.e., one cannot be obligated to do what one cannot do, the question of corporate responsibility cannot be discussed intelligibly without an inquiry into the range of corporate or managerial discretion. Hence, the moral relevance of a theory of the firm. Within classical or neo-classical economic theory, for instance, firms which act other than to maximize profit are eliminated. They cannot do otherwise, and thus either have no obligations at all or only the duty to maximize profit. The thesis of the Managerial Revolution, if true, establishes only that management is free from direct stockholder control. By asserting that corporations have responsibilities to do other than maximize profit, philosophers assume a wide degree of managerial discretion, without considering recent developments in the theory of the firm which suggest that new incentives and constraints radically restrict managerial liberty in a capitalist society.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,122

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Authority in the firm (and the attempt to theorize it away).David Ciepley - 2004 - Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society 16 (1):81-115.
The stakeholder theory and the common good.Antonio Argandoña - 1998 - Journal of Business Ethics 17 (9-10):1093-1102.
Sharing management: Three ethical scenarios. [REVIEW]Cyril Dwiggins - 1986 - Journal of Business Ethics 5 (3):213 - 218.
Business ethics and the management of non-profit institutions.Luk Bouckaert & Jan Vandenhove - 1998 - Journal of Business Ethics 17 (9-10):1073-1081.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
44 (#336,932)

6 months
2 (#1,015,942)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references