Do Collaborators in Science Need to Agree?

Philosophy of Science 86 (5):1029-1040 (2019)
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Abstract

I argue that collaborators do not need to reach broad agreement over the justification of a consensus claim. This is because maintaining a diversity of justifiers within a scientific collaboration has important epistemic value. I develop a view of collective justification that depends on the diversity of epistemic perspectives present in a group. I argue that a group can be collectively justified in asserting that P as long as the disagreement among collaborators over the reasons for P is itself justified. In conclusion, I make a case for multimethod collaborative research and work through an example in the social sciences.

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Citations of this work

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References found in this work

The Fate of Knowledge.Helen E. Longino - 2001 - Princeton University Press.
The Fate of Knowledge.Helen E. Longino - 2002 - Princeton University Press.
Making Medical Knowledge.Miriam Solomon - 2015 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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